Scientists, Other Citizens, and the Art of Practical Reasoning by Meyer, Gitte
Iowa State University Summer Symposium on
Science Communication 2012: Between Scientists & Citizens
Jan 1st, 12:00 AM
Scientists, Other Citizens, and the Art of Practical
Reasoning
Gitte Meyer
Aalborg University, gitte@gittemeyer.eu
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/sciencecommunication
Part of the Other Rhetoric and Composition Commons, Rhetoric Commons, and the Speech
and Rhetorical Studies Commons
This Event is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Symposia at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Iowa State University Summer Symposium on Science Communication by an authorized administrator of Iowa State
University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Meyer, Gitte (2012). Scientists, Other Citizens, and the Art of Practical Reasoning. Jean Goodwin (Ed.), Between Scientists & Citizens.
https://doi.org/10.31274/sciencecommunication-180809-78
Meyer, G. (2012). Scientists, other citizens, and the art of practical reasoning. In J. Goodwin (Ed.), Between scientists & 
citizens: Proceedings of a conference at Iowa State University, June 1-2, 2012 (pp. 297-306). Ames, IA: Great Plains Society 
for the Study of Argumentation. Copyright © 2012 the author(s). 
Scientists, Other Citizens, and the Art of Practical Reasoning 
GITTE MEYER 
Department of Learning and Philosophy 
Aalborg University 
Denmark 
gm@learning.aau.dk 
gitte@gittemeyer.eu 
ABSTRACT: Inspired by the Arendtian distinction between the social and the political, this essay offers a critique 
of the tendency to frame the relationship between (scientific) expert knowledge and (political) democracy as a 
social issue or conflict between ‘ordinary citizens’ and ‘scientific experts’ as social groups. A tentative analysis 
explores the role of scientific expertise in democracies viewed as a practical issue in the classical, Aristotelian 
sense. It is suggested that the notions of praxis and practical reasoning as phronesis offer a framework that allows 
citizenship to scientists and might facilitate the integration of scientific knowledge into public deliberation on 
public affairs, but also would direct attention to the limitations of science. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: AN ANOMALY 
The current discourse on the role of science in society is marked by a tendency to frame the 
relationship between (scientific) expert knowledge and (political) democracy as a social issue, 
or even as a social conflict between ‘ordinary citizens’ and ‘scientific experts’ as social groups. 
As a probably widely unrecognised and unintended consequence of that framing, scientists 
appear—in their capacity as scientists—to be excluded from the citizenry and the civic 
responsibility that citizenship implies. Inspired by the Arendtian distinction between the social 
and the political, this essay offers a critique of such framing. 
 Slaves and women were excluded from citizenship in the classical polis. In principle, 
modern democracies grant citizenship to all adults, and the tendency in the science-society 
discourse to exclude scientists from the citizenry, or to regard them as extraordinary citizens— 
whatever that might imply—appears as a thought-provoking anomaly. Responsibility, it has 
been argued, is a key ethical concept of technological civilisations (Jonas, 1984). Seen in that 
light, the anomaly is also rather worrying. 
 The following brief and tentative inquiry is primarily intended to direct attention to, 
and raise questions about, the anomaly. It is suggested that the science-society discourse may 
have become deadlocked in a framework of thought that combines two tendencies. One is a 
tendency to think in terms of dichotomies; the other is a tendency to constrain analysis of 
societal issues to the use of a social perspective, resulting in a focus on status and power 
relations. 
 It is furthermore suggested that the classical, Aristotelian notions of praxis and 
practical reasoning as phronesis offer a framework that—because it does not take science and 
politics to constitute a dichotomy, but to be substantially different—allows citizenship to 
scientists and might support the integration, case by case, of scientific knowledge into public 
deliberation on public affairs. The framework would, however, also likely bring the issue of 
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the limitations of science to the forefront and should not be perceived as a solution to problems 
concerning the role of science in society.  
2. SCIENTIST OR CITIZEN: A CRITIQUE 
Why is the science-society relationship often seen as a conflict between seemingly 
irreconcilable spheres or activities? And why is that supposed conflict often seen as social 
conflict? These two huge, separate, but interrelated questions must be opened up to reflection. 
2.1 The Assumption of a Science Versus Politics Dichotomy 
Interpretations of the science-society relationship as a fundamental conflict can be seen as 
outcomes of dichotomic—polarised and polarising—frameworks of and for thought. More 
specifically, approaches that radically separate and oppose the roles of the scientist and the 
citizen, respectively, may be viewed as reflections of a widespread assumption of a dichotomy 
of science versus politics. That assumed dichotomy, in turn, is an instance of an entire range of 
assumed dichotomies that tend to inform, not least, academic discourse and enquiry: truth 
versus power; objectivity versus subjectivity; observation versus participation; and the spiritual 
versus the material are a few examples of such assumed dichotomies. Indeed, the dichotomy 
appears to be a dominant figure of thought in academic work, originating, it seems, in the 
notion of universal truth and the corresponding arch-dichotomy of truth versus falsity (Meyer 
& Lund, 2008b). 
 An antagonistic force has been ascribed to the monotheistic or secondary religions 
that brought the truth versus falsity dichotomy into the domain of human beliefs (Assmann, 
2010). There are of course important differences between the religious and scientific idea(l)s of 
universal truth, but there are also some striking similarities and a shared history of interaction, 
as evidenced, for instance, in the significance of the English civil, confessional wars to the 
early development of science (Sprat, 1667/1734). Not only monotheistic religions, but also 
scientific monism may inspire dualism and be disinclined to acknowledge or even consider its 
own boundaries and/or limitations. Perhaps, one of the most striking similarities is the above 
antagonistic force, expressed as a capacity to generate dichotomies, and as a general inclination 
to make dichotomic distinctions. 
 Dichotomies, however, represent a particular variety of distinctions. They express 
opposite valuations of things, phenomena or qualities that seem to be taken, as the point of 
departure, to be substantially similar and to represent the two sides of the same coin. The two 
sides of an assumed dichotomy are mutually exclusive and interdependent: truth is defined by 
not being false, objectivity by not being subjectivity, and vice-versa. 
 The phenomenon of normative inversions (Assmann, 2010) may bring about re-
valuations—or, if you prefer, ‘re-volutions.’ A positive valuation of objectivity and a negative 
valuation of subjectivity may be supplanted by a positive valuation of a re-interpretation of 
subjectivity and a negative valuation of a re-interpretation of objectivity. A new school, or 
theory, or ‘-ism’ is founded without affecting the basic assumption of a dichotomy. Thus, a 
normative inversion that shifts the balance from objectivity to subjectivity, or from subjectivity 
to objectivity, does not affect the very assumption of an objectivity versus subjectivity 
dichotomy, and does not raise questions concerning the proper reach and applicability of that 
dichotomy. Actually, the accumulated effect, over the centuries, of series of normative 
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inversions could be that the dichotomy acquires the appearance of a general, or even natural, 
figure of and for thought, rather than a particular one. 
 If so, dichotomic forms of distinction may be applied indiscriminately to all kinds of 
differences. Even the capacity for critical judgement—the very ability, that is, to make 
distinctions—may be ascribed the quality of being negative and in opposition to something as 
opposed to being positive toward and supportive of it (Marcuse, 1968). What is more, attempts 
to escape dichotomic deadlocks may take the form of general assaults on the very practice of 
making distinctions at all (for possible examples of this see for instance Callon, 1986; Latour, 
1993). 
 Our question, now, concerns the assumption of a science versus politics dichotomy. 
Taking into account a possible origin in a dichotomic framework, it can be linked to several 
other assumed dichotomies: truth versus power; facts versus emotions; and facts versus values 
spring to mind. These connect science to truth and facts, and politics to power, emotions and 
values. In order, however, for the assumption of a fundamental conflict between science and 
politics to make sense, they must be perceived to be substantially similar and, thus, to be 
concerned with similar questions. But are they substantially similar in that sense, or should 
they rather be considered to be concerned with different questions? Monistic—and thus 
potentially dualistic—frameworks of and for thought seem to hamper rather than facilitate 
reflections along those lines. 
2.2 The Interpretation of the Science-society Relationship as a Social Conflict 
Our second question concerns the transformation of the assumed fundamental conflict between 
science and politics into a social conflict between scientific experts and (ordinary) citizens as 
social categories. Although some of the major themes of the science-society discourse relate to 
political notions such as ‘citizen’ and ‘democracy,’ a social perspective is widely applied and 
seems almost to be taken for granted. Where does that perspective take us? 
 The social perspective represents a view on humans as one of those animal species 
that live in groups. In order to study humans from that perspective, one has to adopt the 
position of an outside observer. The position facilitates that social groups or categories may be 
identified by the criterion of homogeneity. Patterns of resemblances and differences become 
visible. Status and power relations, and the degree of distance or intimacy within or among 
groups, come into focus. Furthermore, the objects of study appear to the observer as possible 
targets of technical intervention aimed at affecting the social relationships or mechanisms of or 
among groups. The social perspective, thus, can be characterised as an offspring of the 
classical notion of techne, extended and applied to human beings and human affairs. 
 Techne belongs in the sphere of production. Correspondingly, interpretations of social 
relationships as those between producers and consumers are widespread. Scientists, for 
instance, may be seen as producers of scientific knowledge. Knowledge, then, comes to be 
seen as a good for possession and/or distribution and consumption, and other citizens appear as 
consumers of knowledge. Interpretations along such lines have belonged to the staples of the 
science communication discourse for decades (Friedman, Dunwoody & Rogers, 1986). 
Alternatively, knowledge may be seen as a tool for power holders, and connected to social 
conflicts between scientists, as holders of knowledge power, and other citizens, as knowledge-
have-nots (Felt, 2003; Goede, 2002). 
GITTE MEYER 
300 
 In general terms, the social perspective directs attention to hierarchies and social 
(in)equalities, to the fair distribution of goods, and to the fair representation of different social 
groups. It also diverts attention from the substance of issues. Precisely for that reason, it has 
been argued, references to social distinctions were disapproved of in the coffee houses of the 
early enlightenment (Sennett, 1986). 
 When seen from the social perspective, thus, the role of science in public deliberation 
on public affairs is transformed into an issue of status and power relations. Moreover, the 
classical understanding of the public or citizenry is marginalised. The diverse group of citizens 
who are bound together merely by co-responsibility for public affairs does not constitute a 
social group. Strictly speaking, it has no place in social reality. 
 Another ancient figure of thought is more compatible with the social perspective: the 
assumed dichotomy of the masses versus the elites. 
 The notions of the masses and the elites have been significant in modern, Western 
social thought (see for instance Bottomore, 1964/1971; Carey, 1992; Mills, 1956/2000; Ortega 
y Gasset, 1930/1993; Veblen, 1899) but are in fact neither particularly modern nor particularly 
Western. Thus, the idea that members of a society are divided into the masses and the elites has 
been influential also in pre-modern times (Hill, 1961/2010) and non-Western cultures 
(Hourani, 2002). The positive valuation of the notion of masses, on the other hand, is probably 
predominantly a modern idea or, if you prefer, represents a modern normative inversion, 
connected to what has aptly been termed the invention of the people (Morgan, 1989). 
 The two notions can be seen as pre-modern exemplars of social categories or groups. 
Each group is characterised by homogenous features. The elites occupy power positions in the 
economic, political and intellectual systems; the masses do not. Looking back, for example, to 
seventeenth-century English discourse, the latter group was freely talked about as “the rabble 
that cannot read” (Morgan, 1989) or “the unknowing multitude,” but positive references to “the 
people” also gained some momentum (Hill, 1961/2010). In current usage, less immediately 
demeaning expressions, such as ‘the average citizen’ or ‘ordinary people’ are common. 
 A positive valuation of the masses became manifest during and in the wake of the 
American War of Independence and has been connected to a wave of fascination with 
quantitative science: 
People now [early nineteenth century] described society more and more as a ‘mass’ and for the first 
time began using this term in reference to ‘almost innumerable wills’ in a positive, nonpejorative 
sense. The individual was weak and blind, said George Bancroft in a common reckoning, but the 
mass of people was strong and wise. From all this followed, too, a new appreciation of statistics: in 
1803 the word ‘statisticks’ first appeared in American dictionaries. (Wood, 1993, p. 360). 
Along related lines, the rise of quantitative science has been connected to anti-elitism (Porter, 
1995). 
 The view of society as an entity divided into the masses and the elites has remained a 
staple of social thought and continues to give rise to conflicting interpretations and valuations. 
The Dewey-Lippmann controversy of the 1920s can be seen as a model of such conflicts 
(Dewey, 1927/1991; Lippmann, 1922/1997). But the very notion of the masses—and, thereby, 
the assumed dichotomy that it forms part of—has also been subjected to critique. It is a 
contested concept (Collier, Hidalgo & Maciuceanu, 2008). 
 As a quantitative concept, the notion of the masses simply signifies the many, the 
majority. As a qualitative term it has been connected to a kind of person—that has come to be, 
or to be perceived to be common—who is motivated primarily by the immediate prospects of 
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pain, pleasure and gain, who is caught up in concerns with his or her private affairs, and who is 
easily manipulated and disinclined to engage in any kind of abstract thinking (Arendt, 1958–
59). The rise, on a grand scale, of such assumptions about the general public, perceived as a 
mass audience, seems expressed in journalistic criteria that stress the importance of 
dramatisation, emotional appeal and what’s-in-it-for-me approaches (Meyer & Lund, 2008a). 
 A pertinent question to our issue concerns whether and how the discourse on the 
science-society relationship may have been affected by the assumed dichotomy between the 
social categories of the masses and the elites. The discourse draws heavily on the notion of the 
layperson, inherited from the medieval church (Meyer & Sandøe, in press). At the same time, 
the social categories of the scientific experts and the ordinary citizens can be seen as 
representatives of an (intellectual) elite and the (lay) masses. 
 Transformed into a social concept, thus, the notion of the citizen seems to have come 
to signify a subject who is excluded from positions of power, and who lacks (scientific) 
knowledge. This interpretation, in turn, takes us some way toward understanding the puzzling 
tendency to exclude scientists from (ordinary) citizenship. But there is more to it than that. The 
predominance in the science-society discourse of the social perspective may be doing away 
altogether with the classical idea of the citizen. Actually, neither scientists nor other citizens 
appear to be regarded as citizens in that sense. 
 Against that background, critical reflection among participants in the science-society 
discourse might be directed to questions such as: Do terms such as ‘average citizens’ and 
‘ordinary people’ come with tacit and potentially self-fulfilling assumptions concerning, 
among other things, the absence of intellectual capacity in the public? If so, how might that 
affect the general ability of democratic knowledge societies, that are pervaded by scientific 
enquiries and knowledge claims, to deal with the outcomes of such enquiries and to assess such 
claims? How might individual scientists and the scientific community as a whole be affected 
by a discourse that excludes scientists from (ordinary) citizenship? Have we somehow become 
locked into a framework of thought that has—through its combination of inherent dualism and 
a tendency to constrain analysis of societal issues to the use of a social perspective—
transformed the debate over the role of science in public deliberation on public affairs into a 
fundamental conflict between scientific experts and (ordinary) citizens perceived as social 
groups? 
3. A WIDER FRAMEWORK: AN EXPLORATION 
Using the classical, Aristotelian approach to the public or citizenry as our point of departure 
might take us in other directions that could lead to other tentative answers to the science-
society question—and to other possible problems. 
 In its modernised version, the classical definition of the citizenry in principle grants 
citizenship to all adults. It comes with the advantage that it does not exclude scientists from 
citizenship. It seems, therefore, worthwhile to briefly explore the background of the 
understanding of the citizenry as a diverse group that is bound together by the co-responsibility 
for public affairs, and by the capacities for thought and speech that identify human beings as 
political animals. This idea of the public is much older than modern science. Does it make 
sense in and to the knowledge societies of today? 
  
GITTE MEYER 
302 
3.1 The Classical Notions of Praxis and Practical Reasoning 
The Aristotelian understanding of the citizenry belongs in a three-dimensional, non-dichotomic 
framework of thought that operates with a particularly human dimension of reality —praxis—
and regards politics as constituting the highest form of that dimension. Life, according to 
Aristotle, is action (praxis), not production (Aristotle, trans. 1992, I.iv). The notion of praxis, 
thus, seems to be the proper starting point for possible re-interpretations. 
 Praxis differs from the mechanics of nature and the unlimited universe in the same 
way that human beings differ from other animals and gods. Human life as praxis is marked by 
unpredictability, uncertainty and diversity. It is also characterised by the human capacity to 
act—and, thus, to deliberate on action—on those conditions (Arendt, 1969). Humankind is 
composed of a multitude of different humans, and all have different perspectives on human 
affairs, but as political animals they are able to deal with the uncertainty of those affairs in a 
specifically human way: exchange between different points of view is the practical-political 
mode (Crick, 1962/2005). 
 The political institution of public discussion or deliberation is concerned with proper 
and rightful action, not with questions relating to universal truth. It is preconditioned by the 
existence of citizens who are both willing and able to participate critically—and, thus, to pay 
thorough attention to the substance of issues (Aristotle, trans. 2002, A.III, IV; Hastrup 2002)—
in public deliberation on public affairs, as distinct from the private affairs of households and 
matters of religion. There is, in other words, no compatibility with ideas about laypersons in 
political life, nor with assumptions of a dichotomic relationship between participation and 
deliberation (Mutz, 2006), nor with other assumed dichotomies relating to human affairs. 
 The view of human life as praxis is accompanied by a concept of practical reason or 
phronesis (Arendt, 1969; Gadamer, 2001; MacIntyre, 1984; Schnädelbach, 2007). It differs 
from technical rationality and from the contemplation of universal truth in much the same way 
that humans differ from other animals and from gods, and that life as praxis differs from the 
unlimited and the mechanical dimensions of reality. Phronesis is a worldly, temporal and 
personal kind of reason. Aimed at proper and rightful action, and suited to the conditions of 
limitations, diversity and uncertainty, it has purposes, but no objects or aims of control. 
Practical reasoners make assessments case by case—including, at the same time, factual and 
normative aspects of individual cases—while drawing on personal experience and taking other 
points of view into account. 
 The political institution of public discussion, with its inherent pluralism, makes sense 
only in regard to those assumptions that connect the human condition with limitations and with 
the human capacities of thought and speech. It is an institution for enquiry into practical, 
political problems that can neither be answered by religion nor be solved by technical means, 
but which may include elements that relate to specialised knowledge (Aristotle, trans. 2002, A. 
II). There is uncertainty and diversity. Reasonable argumentation and critical assessments are 
possible; proof is not. It is, therefore, necessary to include multiple points of view in 
discussions and to avoid allowing anyone a monopoly on reason with respect to practical 
issues. Such multiple viewpoints must be dealt with through discussion among citizens who are 
co-responsible for public affairs and represent different perspectives on issues. 
 The classical understanding of politics, thus, marks it out as substantially different 
from modern science, circling the concept of universal truth and operating along the lines of 
technical rationality. At the same time, however, the practice of doing science appears as an 
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instance of praxis; it is a human endeavour, subject to the practical conditions of uncertainty, 
unpredictability and human diversity. 
 Of immediate relevance to the current science-society discourse is the assumption that 
uncertainty is fundamental to the human condition. During recent decades, uncertainty has 
been seen to be re-discovered. Scientific uncertainty has become a key term in the science-
society discourse, and attempts have been made to understand this disturbing aspect of modern 
or post-modern science (among numerous possible examples, see for instance Beck, 1992; 
Friedman, Dunwoody, & Rogers, 1999). If viewed, however, from a classical, practical 
perspective, the specificity of the notion of scientific uncertainty is unhelpful, and attempts to 
solve the problem by technical-scientific means are counterproductive. 
 As the use of scientific methods and approaches has expanded into ever more walks of 
life, scientific enquiry has come to be increasingly concerned with human affairs and practical, 
political issues. No wonder, then, that the condition of uncertainty increasingly makes itself 
felt. It is a general feature of praxis and an expression of those limitations that form part of the 
human condition. It is not a technical problem that can be solved, but an indication of basic 
conditions that should be recognised. 
 From this perspective, the expansion of science also increases the need to consider its 
limitations, not least when scientific experts participate in public exchanges as citizens with 
specialised knowledge. There is a place for scientific rationality within the wider framework of 
practical knowledge pluralism and critical, practical reasoning. Scientific knowledge may be 
integrated (Gadamer, 2001) into public deliberation on public affairs. But the place comes, as 
places do, with boundaries. They do not follow the lines of a dichotomy of facts versus values 
and cannot be defined once and for all, but need continuous attention. That challenge, however, 
connected as it is to a distinction between technical and practical issues which is no longer in 
vogue, might be perceived by many as alien and perhaps even as hostile to science. 
3.2 Practical Reason and Scientific Rationality: Conflict and Complementarity 
With their revised translations of classical texts and with their often keen interest in societal 
debate, Renaissance humanists gave the Aristotelian approach to ethics, politics and rhetoric a 
new lease of life (Kristeller, 1961). Against that background, the rise of modern science has 
been described as a Counter-Renaissance (Toulmin, 1990), and it has been noted that the 
distinction between praxis and production already was rejected by Hobbes in the early 
seventeenth century (Höffe, 2010). Indeed, both to the early and the later development of 
modern science, many are likely to have regarded the notion of a particularly human sphere of 
action as praxis, with its pluralism and its emphasis on the limitations of human endeavours, as 
an inappropriate frame that stood in the way of the (unlimited) progress of mankind. 
 Evolving in a climate of confessional warfare—related at the same time to politics and 
religion (Schorn-Schütte, 2010; Worden, 2009) —some of the founding features of modern 
science can be seen as aiming to escape the dangerous sphere of conflicting confessions (Sprat, 
1667/1734). Somewhat paradoxically, however, the development of ideas of science may still 
have been informed by the very mental climate they were actually intended to counteract. To 
some extent, confessional features, connected to the notion of universal truth, may have been 
mimed and carried on, including such tendencies as to think in stark terms of pro- versus anti-
science attitudes and to generate science wars. 
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 More subtle approaches may be inspired by the history of the various enlightenment 
movements that contributed to the continuous development of ideas about science and modern 
democracy during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Recent decades have witnessed 
considerable numbers of accounts of those movements. Together these accounts portray the 
enlightenment as a tradition of multiple strains, and of tensions (see for instance Bahr, 2002; 
Jacob, 2006; Porter, 2001). Some of those tensions are encapsulated in the enlightenment 
motto: sapere aude which can be translated into dare to know (Kramnick, 1995) and into have 
courage to use your own reason (Kant, 1784/1995). 
 Equally valid, the two translations can be seen as representing a conflict between 
phronetic reasoning and the authority of scientific rationality, and, at the same time, as 
indicating a complementary relationship between those two varieties of reason. Along that line, 
the indiscriminate use of, and appeal to, scientific expertise would be considered a fallacy, as 
would the indiscriminate rejection of such uses and appeals. One task of practical reasoning 
would be to facilitate critical reflection and discussion case by case of whether or not, or to 
what extent, scientific approaches should be deemed appropriate to the issue in question. One 
should dare to know, and to use one’s own reason. The very relationship between scientific 
rationality and practical reasoning can be seen as constituted by conflict and complementarity 
and, thus, by a combined capacity to keep each other in check. 
4. CONCLUSION: COPING WITH THE EXPANSION OF SCIENCE 
It is the tentative conclusion of this brief exploration that a re-introduction of the classical 
notions of praxis and phronesis into the science-society discourse not only offers a framework 
that allows ordinary citizenship to scientists and includes them in the co-responsibility for 
public affairs that citizenship implies. The framework also comes with the demand that the 
limitations of science be considered case by case as part of a continuous public discussion in 
the shape of practical reasoning among citizens that represent multiple points of view. 
Therefore, the framework possibly could be perceived as an affront to science, but it can also 
be seen as offering a possibility for scientists to combine the role of scientist with that of the 
co-responsible citizen. And it can be seen as a possibility for modern knowledge democracies 
to cope with the expansion of science in a reasonable way, steering clear of the pitfalls of 
populism and technocracy. 
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